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  1 
Introduction  
 
 
Yet it is the most common thing in the world for a person to decide that he 
should (or should not) do so-and-so on grounds of loyalty to his friend, 
family, organization, community, country, or species. Indeed, it is likely 
that loyalties ground more of the principled, self-sacrificing, and other 
kinds of nonselfish behavior in which people engage than do moral 
principles and ideals. (Oldenquist 1982, 173) 
 
 
Influenza pandemics are a fact of nature. Our human history is marked by global 
influenza outbreaks that have stricken large numbers of people with illness, caused many 
deaths, and disrupted the social and economic life of many communities, states, and 
nations. A novel influenza virus spreading efficiently human to human and causing 
severe illness causes an influenza pandemic. In the last three hundred years there have 
been at least ten influenza pandemics (IOM 2005; Osterholm 2005a). The twentieth 
century alone experienced three pandemics in 1918, 1957, and 1968 (HHS 2005).  
Seasonal influenza results in approximately 36,000 deaths and 226,000 
hospitalizations annually in the United States, while a severe influenza pandemic could 
cause as many as 1.9 million deaths and 9.9 million hospitalizations (HHS 2005). The 
sudden onset of illness will severely overwhelm the health care system and create a 
scarcity of essential resources, which will challenge health officials and community 
leaders to develop pandemic response plans1 that provide care for the ill. Even while 
planning efforts are underway, the risks posed by a pandemic are not likely to be 
eliminated. 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis the phrase ‘pandemic response plans’ denotes an operational plan. Operational 
plans attempt to identify the resources, responsibilities, and tasks necessary to implement response 
strategies. As each community is unique, each pandemic response plan must be tailored to the resources 
and personnel available to respond during a pandemic. 
  2 
The fundamental difficulty in pandemic planning and response is twofold: 1) 
there are limited material and human resources upon which a community may draw; and 
2) a severe disease outbreak creates social disunity (Schoch-Spana 2000b; Barry 2004). A 
pandemic raises many ethical issues. In the area of health care, ethical issues are even 
more pronounced in that medical resources are highly valued and sought after. While 
there are many important ethical issues involved in a community response to a pandemic 
outbreak, this thesis will focus on the obligations that health care workers, support staff, 
and community members have to provide care to the ill during a pandemic. The ethical 
issues raised by a pandemic can be viewed as the need to resolve the struggle between the 
individual and the group (Capron 2007). As such the most difficult challenge during a 
pandemic will be to balance private interests with public interests.   
The SARS experience demonstrates that an effective response to an infectious 
disease outbreak requires health care professionals and institutions to put aside self-
interest or territoriality and utilize a collaborative approach (University Joint Centre for 
Bioethics [JCB] 2005). To develop effective pandemic response plans communities must 
cooperate in developing response plans that identify stakeholders and resources, defines a 
common operating picture, and describes roles and responsibilities. Collaboration and 
cooperation requires the willingness to provide aid to others in need and the willingness 
to sacrifice personal or institutional interests for public interests. Essentially, the 
community must develop an attitude of solidarity, which presupposes loyalty to the 
response effort and community participation in the development of the response plan.  
Solidarity is often listed as an important value for pandemic preparedness (Capron 
2007; Thompson et al. 2006; Torda 2006; JCB 2005; Gostin 2005; Kotalik 2005); 
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however, there is little explanation of the term’s meaning or use. In Europe the concept of 
solidarity is defined as: “The preparedness to share resources with others by personal 
contribution to those in struggle or in need and through taxation and redistribution 
organised by the state” (Stjerno 2004, 2). In the United States (U.S.) this conception of 
solidarity is more commonly associated with the notion of “social responsibility” (AHRQ 
2006). While there are different ways of defining “solidarity,” the concept advanced in 
this thesis is drawn from the Polish philosopher Karol Wojtyla,2 who emphasizes the 
value of personal actions in developing the attitude of solidarity in the community.  
For Wojtyla solidarity is an attitude of a community that initiates participation and 
fosters the realization of the common good (1979). In this sense solidarity is defined as a 
“firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good” (Pontifical 
Council on Justice and Peace [PCJP] 2005, 85). Wojtyla’s concept of solidarity stems 
from his understanding of participation, which brings into focus the human capacity to 
experience suffering and joy (DeMarco 2003). From this understanding solidarity is 
simply the “virtue of care as extended to all other people in society” (DeMarco 2003). In 
this sense solidarity is a virtue and a desirable social characteristic.  
Unlike notions of solidarity that emphasize “social functions,” such as the 
conception of solidarity advance by the sociologist Emile Durkheim (1960), Wojtyla’s 
notion emphasizes a solidarity of persons (Doran 1996). This conception of solidarity is 
superior for pandemic planning and response because it emphasizes the value of personal 
action in the community. This is important as government entities have a limited ability 
to assist local communities in preparing for and responding to a pandemic. This 
                                                 
2
 Karol Wojtyla was elected Pope John Paul II in 1978.  
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conception of solidarity presupposes the values of loyalty and participation; thus, it is 
necessary to examine these notions in order to develop a more thorough understanding of 
solidarity.  
Solidarity requires a commitment to the common good and commitments are 
based upon loyalty. The American philosopher Josiah Royce defines loyalty as “the 
willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause” (2005, 861). A 
cause to which people can be loyal must be tangible and grounded in reality, otherwise it 
will not be compelling (Trotter 1999). In the context of pandemic influenza loyalty means 
to devote oneself to the common good by serving the cause of the pandemic response 
plan. A well-defined pandemic response plan should clearly articulate the cause and the 
actions necessary to serve the cause.  In order to develop a cause that inspires loyalty, 
individuals, community groups, health care institutions, and governments must 
participate in the development of the pandemic response plan.   
In the broad sense participation is the activity of individuals or groups to 
contribute to the political and social life of the community (PCJP 2005). Creating 
opportunities for public participation in pandemic planning expresses the equal value of 
all community members (Childress 2003). Public participation is a matter of justice 
because the public has a right to participate in governmental decisions that impact life 
chances or infringes on individual rights (Eckenwiler 2003; Childress 2003). The 
participation of the public in the development of pandemic response strategies will build 
trust between the general public and those responsible for implementing response plan. It 
will also help to inspire loyalty to the response effort and foster solidarity in the 
community. 
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Pandemic influenza affects a society’s heath, as well as its ethics. Therefore, 
developing a proper response to pandemic outbreak requires attention to both science and 
ethics. In the field of public health ethical values such as necessity, effective means, 
proportionality, least infringement, public justification, fairness, distributive justice, and 
procedural justice are often utilized to examine ethical issues (Kass 2001; Roberts and 
Reich 2002; Gostin 2003; Kass, 2004). In the context of pandemic influenza the ethical 
values of individual liberty, public protection, proportionality, reciprocity, transparency, 
privacy, protections against stigmatization, duty to provide care, equity, solidarity (JCB 
2005), protection of vulnerable populations, fair treatment and social justice, and least 
restrictive alternative (IOM 2005) are advanced as relevant considerations for addressing 
the various ethical issue that arise.   
There is no single ethical framework robust enough to adequately address the 
various issues that arise in pandemic planning and response. Pandemic influenza is a 
social problem that requires a social effort in planning, preparedness, and response. The 
values of participation, loyalty, and solidarity are fundamental social values that are 
critical to sustain the life of communities. The study of these values will assist local 
officials with an ethical approach for developing pandemic response plans that ensures 
community participation, incorporates fundamental values, and minimizes conflicting 
obligations in the planning stages, which in turn inspires loyalty to the response effort 
and fosters an attitude of solidarity in the community during the pandemic. While these 
values do not dictate specific response strategies, they inform the development of 
strategies that can be tailored to specific communities.  
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Chapter 1: The Pandemic Threat 
 
 
An influenza pandemic is likely to occur almost simultaneously across 
countries and communities. It will demand that every aspect of our 
communities be self-sufficient, able to deal with the outbreak of illness 
should it hit. Political leaders, employers, school leaders, healthcare 
leaders, faith-based and community organizations, families and the media 
must all be informed, engaged, and actively involved. (Leavitt 2006, 8) 
 
 
Infectious Diseases 
 
Infectious disease-related deaths in the U.S. have nearly doubled in the last 25 
years to 170,000 annually since reaching a historic low in 1980 (National Intelligence 
Estimate 2000). An infectious disease is an illness caused by a specific infectious agent 
that is spread from an infected person, animal, or inanimate reservoir to a susceptible 
host, either directly or indirectly, through an intermediate plant or animal host, vector, or 
inanimate environment. Examples of infectious diseases include: HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis (TB), malaria, hepatitis B and C, measles, and influenza. Twenty well-
known diseases, such as TB, malaria, and cholera, have reemerged or spread 
geographically since 1973, often in a more virulent and drug resistant form. Also, since 
1973, thirty previously unknown disease agents have been identified, such as HIV/AIDS, 
Ebola, hepatitis C, and Nipah virus, for which there are no available cures (National 
Intelligence Estimate 2000). 
Historically, infectious diseases cause more death than wars or natural disasters. 
For example, the “Black Death” killed approximately one third of the European 
population during the 14th century, the 1918 Influenza Pandemic killed up to 100 million 
people in a period of twenty-four months, and smallpox killed more people in the 20th 
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century than all of the wars of that century combined (Selgelid 2005). Furthermore, 
infectious diseases traditionally account for more military hospitalizations than battlefield 
wounds (National Intelligence Estimate 2000). Among the most contagious infectious 
diseases is influenza, which will remain essentially an uncontrolled disease because 
influenza viruses replicate and spread easily among humans (National Intelligence 
Estimate 2000).  
 
Influenza 
Occasionally a novel influenza virus emerges to which the human population has 
little or no immunity and a pandemic (worldwide epidemic) causing widespread illness is 
possible. A virus that attacks primarily the upper respiratory tract—the nose, throat, and 
bronchi, and rarely the lungs—causes influenza. The infection is characterized by a 
sudden onset of fever, myalgia, headache, nonproductive cough, and sore throat 
approximately one to four days after exposure to droplets expelled by an infected 
person’s sneeze or cough. Influenza viruses are categorized as type A, B, or C. Influenza 
A viruses naturally reside in wild birds, predominantly in waterfowl, where they coexist 
in harmony with their host and remain in evolutionary stasis, showing minimal change at 
the amino acid level over long periods of time (Webster et al. 2006). In humans, 
however, influenza A viruses are the most virulent and are responsible for lethal 
pandemics. Influenza A viruses can be further divided into subtypes according to 
differences between two viral surface proteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase 
(NA). There are sixteen H antigens (H1-H16) and nin
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The hallmark feature of the influenza virus is the ability to mutate. All influenza 
viruses have a segmented genome, which can rearrange to produce new viral proteins. 
The new proteins result in new strains of virus. There are two ways an influenza virus can 
mutate. A regular, small, and permanent change in the genetic material of the virus is 
known as antigenic drift. This creates seasonal epidemics and is the reason why an 
influenza vaccine developed for last influenza season will not completely protect against 
the mutated strain of the current season. Because the body lacks specific antibodies to the 
new strain there is incomplete immunity, and thus seasonal vaccinations are necessary. 
The term antigenic shift refers to a substantial genetic change in the virus, which occurs 
through a process known as genetic reassortment. This occurs when two or more 
influenza subtypes from different species, such as bird and pig or bird and human, trade 
and merge genes creating brand new hemagglutinin and neuraminidase surface proteins. 
Genetic reassortment is believed to have caused the 1957 and 1968 pandemics (HHS 
2005). When a change in the virus produces surface proteins to which the human 
population has little or no immunity, a pandemic is possible.  
 
Pandemic Influenza 
 
Many lethal pandemics have been recorded in history. The Institute of Medicine’s 
report The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready? Workshop Summary (2004) 
notes lethal pandemics likely to have been influenza in 1510, 1518, 1688, 1693, 1699, 
1847, 1848, 1889, 1890, and 1918 (IOM 2005). Although many infectious diseases, such 
as SARS, Ebola, HIV or West Nile, can cause severe disease outbreaks, these infections 
are generally limited to localized areas or to at-risk populations; however, pandemic 
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influenza is an explosive global event where nearly all of the world’s population is at risk 
(HHS 2005). Of the twentieth-century pandemics, the 1918 virus caused high morbidity 
and mortality with an estimated 675,000 deaths in the United States (Tumpey et al. 2005; 
Barry 2004, 2005a), while the 1957 virus caused 70,000 deaths, and the 1968 virus 
caused 34,000 deaths (HHS 2005). 
To cause a pandemic a viral strain must have three characteristics: 1) be novel to 
the human population, 2) have increased virulence resulting in high morbidity, and 3) be 
easily transmitted human to human. Influenza is among the most contagious diseases 
known to humanity, and experts agree the most considerable threat to human health today 
is pandemic influenza (WHO 2005b; HHS 2005; National Intelligence Estimate 2003). 
The Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) indicates that the 
pandemics of the 20th century—in 1918, 1957, and 1968—arose from an avian or bird 
lineage of viruses (CIDRAP 2007). At some point these influenza viruses carried initially 
by birds jumped the species barrier to infect humans. Once these viruses adapted to 
human hosts they gained the ability to replicate efficiently and spread human to human, 
causing widespread illness and death. Recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza in poultry in East Asia (H5N1), the Netherlands (H7N7), and Canada (H7N3), 
with subsequent transmission to humans (Gani et al. 2005), represent the emergence of a 
novel influenza virus with pandemic potential.  
 
1918 Pandemic 
The 1918 influenza pandemic killed more people than any single infectious 
disease outbreak in human history. Recent studies estimate the global death toll reached 
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at least 50 million people and possibly 100 million, although it is impossible to know the 
exact death toll, as records were simply not kept in many areas (Barry 2004, 2005a). In 
1918 the world’s population was approximately one-third of what it is today, and if we 
apply the 1918 mortality percentages to the world’s current population it could mean 
180-360 million deaths worldwide, which is five times the number of documented AIDS 
deaths (Osterholm 2005a).  
The deadly 1918 influenza pandemic erupted in force in late August where 
epidemics of unprecedented lethality broke out in Boston (U.S.), Brest (France), and 
Freetown (Sierra Leone), after which the virus quickly blanketed the globe. The rapid 
onset of illness overwhelmed hospitals, and as a result gymnasiums, state armories, and 
church halls were used as emergency hospitals. The 1918 influenza infected health care 
workers, caregivers, pharmacists, laboratory workers, and other personnel. Critical 
personnel shortages in industry, government, and infrastructure, including law 
enforcement, sanitation, fire protection, postal delivery, transportation, health care, and 
food services, hampered response efforts (Barry 2004). Hospitals were forced to turn 
patients away, extend staff hours, tasks student doctors and nurses, and prepare makeshift 
accommodations in halls, offices, porches, and tents (Schoch-Spana 2000b).  
In many areas hospitals were closed due to overcrowding or inadequate staffing 
and alternative care sites were not available. As a result many people suffered at home, 
lacking the strength or opportunity to go to the hospital even if one were open. Social 
workers, visiting nurses, and Red Cross volunteers provided home health services in 
addition to food, childcare, and burial assistance (Schoch-Spana 2000b). In Philadelphia, 
more than 11,000 people died during the month of October, and over the course of 31 
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days 195,000 Americans died (Kenner 1998). The speed at which people died made it 
impossible to dispose of the bodies in a timely manner:  
In Philadelphia, bodies remained uncollected in homes for days, until 
eventually open trucks and even horse-drawn carts were sent down city 
streets and people were told to bring out the dead. The bodies were 
stacked without coffins and buried in cemeteries in mass graves dug by 
steam shovels (Barry 2005a, 65). 
 
The demand for coffins was so severe that “Washington D.C seized railroad cars with 
coffins that were en route to Pittsburgh, where the demand was equally desperate” 
(Schoch-Spana 2000b, 1412). With the demand for burial services high “some funeral 
homes and cemeteries were accused of price gouging, and local leaders were accused of 
not doing enough to help the bereaved” (Schoch-Spana 2000b, 1412). 
In rural Kentucky, the Red Cross reported that “people were starving to death not 
from lack of food but because the well were panic-stricken and would not go near the 
sick” (Barry 2005a, 66). In some places desperate calls for volunteer assistance fell upon 
deaf ears. For example, the head of one city’s volunteer effort wrote in frustration:   
Hundreds of women who are content to sit back had delightful dreams of 
themselves in the roles of angels of mercy, had the unfathomable vanity to 
imagine that they were capable of great sacrifice. Nothing seems to rouse 
them now. They have been told that there are families in which every 
member is ill, in which the children are actually starving because there is 
no one to give them food. The death rate is so high and they still hold 
back. (Barry 2005a, 66) 
 
Ultimately, the Red Cross concluded, “A fear and panic of the influenza, akin to the 
terror of the Middle Ages regarding the Black Plague, [has] been prevalent in many parts 
of the country” (Barry 2005a, 66). 
In 1918 state and local health officials suspended public gatherings, meetings 
were postponed, funerals were banned, retail hours were curtailed, and schools and 
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churches were closed (Schoch-Spana 2000b; Barry 2004). The fear, panic, and disruption 
that ensued after the outbreak began were aided by false assurances from governments 
and newspapers. Americans quickly realized that officials were trying to downplay the 
impact of the outbreak, and this destroyed all trust in authority. As a result society began 
to break apart and in some instances doctors and nurses were kidnapped (Barry 2005b). 
Health officials and citizens alike succumbed to the stress. A health officer in San 
Francisco shot a citizen for not putting on a protective mask, and in Chicago a man slit 
the throats of his wife and children (Kenner 1998). This influenza outbreak was so severe 
that the Chief of Staff of the German Imperial Army, General Erich Ludendorff, 
concluded that it was influenza and not the fresh troops that ended World War I (IOM 
2005). 
During the early stages of the outbreak, the scientist Victor Vaughan stated, “If 
the epidemic continues its mathematical rate of acceleration, civilization could easily … 
disappear … from the face of the earth within a matter of a few more weeks” (Barry 
2005b, 66). The 1918 pandemic fostered both social cohesion and distance. Partly due to 
the mobilization for WWI, Americans had a well-developed sense of solidarity when the 
epidemic erupted. On the one hand, neighbors took care of one another, fed the sick, and 
joined volunteer organizations; on the other hand, groups were pitted against one another 
to assign blame and compete for limited resources (Schoch-Spana 2000b). Hospitals in 
Baltimore were closed to African Americans, and public health officials defended the 
city’s poor public health record by attributing the high mortality rate to the African 
American population (Schoch-Spana 2000b). 
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  It is estimated that one third of the world’s population was clinically infected by 
the virus, and fatality rates were >2.5 percent compared to <0.1 percent in other influenza 
pandemics (Taubenberger and Morens 2006). The most striking feature of this virus is 
that it caused an unusually high death rate in the young and healthy, ages 15-34; 
subsequently, the average life expectancy in the United States was lowered by more than 
10 years after the 1918 pandemic (Glezen 1996; Tumpey et al. 2005). While the overall 
fatality rate is estimated at 2.5 percent, some populations were affected at much higher 
rates. In the Fiji islands the virus killed 14 percent of the population in 16 days, and in 
Labrador and Alaska the virus killed “at least one-third of the entire native population” 
(Barry 2005a, 61).  
Two unusual features of the 1918 virus were that the symptoms it caused did not 
appear to be influenza, and the highest fatality rates occurred in the otherwise young and 
healthy, a trend not associated with influenza. Early on the cause of the disease was 
typically misdiagnosed as dengue, cholera, or typhoid, and one striking complication 
caused by the disease was “hemorrhage from mucous membranes, especially from the 
nose, stomach, and intestine” (Barry 2005a, 61). In 1918 influenza and pneumonia deaths 
were >20 times higher than previous years for those between the ages of 15-34. Normal 
epidemiological charting of death rates caused by influenza exhibit a U-shaped pattern. 
For at least 150 years of charting, mortality peaks in the very young and the very old with 
a low frequency of deaths for all ages in between In contrast, the age-specific deaths rates 
in the 1918 pandemic exhibited a W-shaped curve, indicating a high death rate among 
young adults age 20-40, which has not been documented before or since the 1918 
pandemic (Taubenberger and Morens, 2006).  
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A primary cause of death in 1918 is believed to have been a virus-induced 
reaction of the immune system known as a cytokine storm, which then lead to acute 
respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) (Barry 2005a; Osterholm 2005a). In many 
instances rapid death occurred in which no secondary bacterial infection could be 
demonstrated (Kilbourne 2006). Why the 1918 virus caused severe illness in the young 
remains a mystery; however, viral sequencing data from the 1918 virus suggest that this 
virus was not a reassortant virus created from existing strains, as in the 1957 and 1968 
pandemics, but from a novel “avian-like” influenza virus derived from an unknown 
source (Taubenberger and Morens 2006). While the exact mechanisms giving the 1918 
virus its extreme virulence are unclear at this time, the fact that the 1918 virus appears to 
be derived from an avian source and is extremely virulent legitimizes worries scientists 
have concerning avian influenza H5N1, which has a demonstrated ability to infect 
humans. While the 1918 pandemic was an extraordinary event and the prospect of a 
similar pandemic occurring is frightening, it is important to realize that most influenza 
cases in 1918 (>95 percent) were mild and essentially indistinguishable from influenza 
cases today (Taubenberger et al. 2005). 
 
H5N1 Threat 
In 1997 an outbreak of avian influenza H5N1 in poultry in Hong Kong 
subsequently caused the first known instances of human infections with this virus. During 
this initial outbreak there were 18 human cases and six fatalities. The H5N1 outbreak that 
began in Hong Kong in 1997 is the most severe and widespread outbreak in birds on 
record (Stimola 2006). The H5N1 virus has spread from Southeast Asia through 
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migratory flyways and infected several mammalian species, thereby expanding its 
geographic and host range (Fauci 2005). Currently, this virus continues to infect humans 
and has a fatality rate of over 50 percent. Virologist Robert Webster notes the H5N1 is 
most lethal influenza virus on which he has ever worked (Madlin et al. 2005). With a 
mortality rate in humans over 50 percent, public health officials are justifiably concerned, 
because this is over one hundred times higher than the mortality rate of seasonal 
influenza and over twenty times higher than that of the 1918 virus (Stimola 2006). 
Studies of H5N1 infections in humans show complications similar to the 1918 
pandemic such as pneumonia, ARDS, cardiac compromise, pulmonary hemorrhage, 
Reye’s syndrome, and sepsis (Writing Committee of the World Health Organization 
2005). Health officials are concerned that the H5N1 virus will mutate to a form that 
transmits efficiently human to human. If this virus retains even half of its virulence (25 
percent fatality rate) the results will be absolutely catastrophic.  
To date the H5N1 virus has yet to gain the ability to spread efficiently human to 
human, although, limited human to human transmission is likely to have occurred in 
some cases. While evidence is mounting that supports the hypothesis that a pandemic 
strain is emerging, it is important to note that “the basis for viral adaptation to efficient 
human to human spread is not known for any influenza virus and there is no way to know 
if the H5N1 is in a parallel process of acquiring this trait” (Taubenberger and Morens 
2006, 21).  
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The Next Pandemic 
The next pandemic could cause clinical illness in 25-35 percent of the population 
and cause death in a substantial number of those infected (HHS 2005). It is estimated the 
next pandemic could cause 865,000 hospitalizations and 209,000 U.S. deaths if the viral 
strain were similar to 1957 and 1968; however, if the next pandemic strain is similar to 
the 1918 virus, it could cause as many as 9.9 million hospitalizations and 1.9 million 
deaths in the U.S. (HHS 2005). While two of the three pandemics of the last century were 
relatively mild, this is no reason to expect that the next pandemic will necessarily be 
mild. 
John Barry, the author of The Great Influenza, The Epic Story of the Deadliest 
Plague in History, writes:  
Virtually every expert on influenza believes another pandemic is nearly 
inevitable, that it will kill millions of people, and that it could kill tens of 
millions… and that it could cause economic and social disruption on a 
massive scale. This disruption itself could kill as well. (2005a, 68) 
 
It is possible that human suffering caused by the illness could be mild compared to the 
suffering caused by the breakdown in civil infrastructure and order (Fabian 2006). 
Summarizing the implications of a pandemic on the modern world, Michael Osterholm 
stated before the House Committee on International Relations: “healthcare systems will 
be overwhelmed and panic will reign” (2005b, 70).  
While not a true pandemic, the 2003 SARS outbreak serves as a sobering warning 
of the consequences of an epidemic to public health. SARS affected 30 countries and 
resulted in 8,439 cases with 812 deaths. In this outbreak the fatality rate for people under 
60 years of age was 13 percent and 43 percent for those over 60 (DiGiovanni et al. 2004). 
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In Toronto, the health care system was not prepared to handle a contagious disease 
outbreak like SARS. For example, a SARS victim who sought care in a Toronto hospital 
was required to spend the night in the emergency room waiting for an inpatient bed, 
subsequently 78 people were infected, five of whom died (American College of 
Emergency Physicians [ACEP] 2005). Unlike influenza, SARS was a coronavirus3 that 
was ultimately contained, a prospect highly unlikely with influenza. The National 
Intelligence Estimate reports that had SARS been even moderately more contagious it 
probably could not have been contained in this highly connected fast-paced world (2003).  
The Institute of Medicine notes the disturbing reality is that the public health 
infrastructure is inadequate and hospitals lack the capacity to handle a surge of patients 
(2005). A pandemic would disrupt health care more than at any time in the past, because 
hospitals have improved efficiency to minimize slack (Barry 2005b).  The American 
Hospital Association (AHA) states that emergency departments are generally “at” or 
“over” capacity (2007). During the past decade, due to cuts in reimbursement and a 
shortage of trained staff, the nation’s hospitals have lost 103,000 staffed hospital beds 
and 7,800 intensive care unit beds (ACEP 2005). The “National Report Card on the State 
of Emergency Medicine,” an evaluation of the emergency medical care system in the 
U.S. concludes that the system needs urgent attention (ACEP 2006). This loss of hospital 
capacity increases ambulance diversions and patient waiting times, which causes 
overcrowding and increases the risk of disease spread.  
                                                 
3
 As a coronavirus, SARS is larger than an influenza virus and spreads less efficiently. Furthermore, the 
SARS virus has a longer incubation period and spreads after the onset of symptoms, unlike influenza, 
which has a short incubation period and can spread while a person is asymptomatic.  
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The 1999-2000 influenza season frustrated U.S. hospitals in ways that parallel 
1918. Hospitals faced shortages of staff, beds, and equipment, and patients were forced to 
endure long delays in care—these disruptions were a result of a nominal surge of patients 
(Schoch-Spana 2000a). A severe pandemic could cause as many as 9.9 million additional 
hospitalizations (HHS 2005), while the number of staffed hospital beds in the U.S. is less 
than one million (AHA 2005). The fragmentation, inefficiencies, and problems with 
access to care in American medicine will pose special challenges during a pandemic 
when the “demand for medical services is crushing” (Center for Biosecurity 2005, 293). 
The University of Toronto’s Joint Centre for Bioethics (JCB) notes one 
consequence of the SARS outbreak was that important medical care was often postponed 
and hospital resources were redirected to the public health emergency (JCB 2005). 
During the next pandemic it is anticipated that some people will have to forego medical 
treatments for ailments such as cancer or heart disease (JCB 2005). During a pandemic 
access to emergency care and intensive care beds will be limited; although non-influenza 
related emergencies and medical conditions will continue to present at hospitals for care. 
There will continue to be trauma injuries, pregnancy complications, and other illnesses 
that require critical care. The mere threat of pandemic influenza affords us the 
opportunity to negotiate our response plans before a pandemic emerges. 
The emergency created by a pandemic will create a situation where the need for 
health care volunteers will increase (ACP 2006). The National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza: Implementation Plan notes that if the medical capacity of a community is 
overwhelmed, it will be impossible to provide the expected level of care; as such, it will 
be necessary to seek assistance from clinical and non-clinical personnel from within the 
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community to provide care (HSC 2006). For example, family members of the ill could be 
asked to assist with administrative and environmental tasks, while qualified clinicians 
may be asked to staff medical care facilities, visit patients in their homes, or provide 
medical advice (HSC 2006). The ACP states that all physicians must be prepared to 
participate in the health care response during a pandemic (2006). For instance, a 
physician who ordinarily works in dermatology may be asked to assist in the emergency 
room. Or a nurse may render services typically rendered by a physician, such as 
diagnosing illness or prescribing treatment.  
Health care workers and volunteers providing direct patient care and support will 
be continually exposed to the risk of infection. Because of this exposure health care 
workers and support staff will likely become ill at rates higher than those in other work 
settings. If health care workers, support staff, and volunteers lack access to supplies of 
personal protective equipment (PPE), it is probable that illness will be very high in a 
health care setting, and if the disease is severe, it is unclear how many would continue to 
place themselves at risk. Under emergency conditions, what obligations do health care 
workers, support staff, and volunteers have to serve in a dangerous work environment 
and provide care to the ill during an infectious disease outbreak?  
Influenza pandemics are unique disasters that pose a grave threat to human health 
and social stability. The Secretary of Health and Human Service writes:  
A pandemic is not like a hurricane or an earthquake, where resources and 
help can be shifted form one area to another. Should it occur, every 
community will need to rely on its own planning and its own resources as 
it fights the outbreak. (Leavitt 2006, 2) 
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By definition pandemic influenza is a worldwide public health event. If the next 
pandemic causes severe illness and death, it will be a worldwide public health 
emergency. Overwhelming illness and a shortage of critical supplies will overwhelm the 
health care systems’ ability to continue to care for those in need. Health care workers, 
support staff, and volunteers will place themselves and their families at risk of infection, 
and this will often create a conflict between loyalties. The potential of a pandemic to 
severely disrupt social life demands community planning, which requires a broad 
discussion of shared values to organize a collective response. The failure to act 
aggressively and plan accordingly could have severe consequences; however, aggressive 
actions now may prove unnecessary and be viewed as draconian or based on hysteria. 
One safeguard from such negative assessments is a public discussion of pandemic 
response strategies and the incorporation of relevant ethical values to assist local officials 
pandemic planning and response. 
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Chapter 2: Community Values: Participation, Loyalty, and Solidarity 
 
Solidarity means standing up for one another, the healthy for the sick, the 
rich for the poor, the countries of the North for those of the South, in the 
knowledge that we have a mutual responsibility and with the awareness 
that it is in giving that we receive, that we can only give that which has 
been given to us, which therefore never simply belongs to us. (Pope 
Benedict XVI 2006)  
 
Ethics 
While pandemic response strategies aimed at ameliorating disease in a community 
may be guided by epidemiological factors, recipients of these interventions judge 
outcomes on moral terms and not on statistical and biological terms. Any discourse on 
health or public health policy presupposes ethical values, principles, norms, interests, and 
preferences (Kotalik 2005). Ethical discussion is part of the normative framework needed 
to assess the cultural acceptability of pandemic response measures (National Governors 
Association 2006; WHO 2005a). Consequently, ethical deliberations ought to be part of 
any policy formation for a pandemic. Ethics can contribute to pandemic planning by 
clarifying underlying values, guiding the development of policy, and informing the 
decision-making process during the emergency. If the ethical issues are not broached 
with the public in the planning stages, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to account for 
community values, garner support, or ensure public compliance during the pandemic.  
As pandemic influenza is a public health emergency, it is appropriate to look to 
the field of public health for relevant values and principles to develop an ethical approach 
for pandemic planning and response (Eckenwiler 2003; Lo and Katz 2005). The field of 
public health is concerned with the prevention of disease and the promotion of health 
throughout society; as such, public health is primarily interested in devising strategies to 
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prevent or mitigate injury and disease, and less interested in clinical interaction between 
health care professionals and patients (Gostin 2003; Olick 2004a). The Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) defines public health as, “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure 
the conditions in which people can be healthy” (1988, 1). This definition of public health 
emphasizes the importance of community and underscores the notions of cooperation and 
mutual obligation with the words “we,” “society,” and “collectively.” It also reinforces 
the fact that everyone in a community has some responsibility for the health of the 
community.  
The community-based focus of public health emphasizes ethical values such as 
participation (Glass and Schoch-Spana 2002; Childress 2003; Eckenwhiler 2003; Kipinis 
2003; Morone and Kilbreth, 2003; Schoch-Spana et al. 2006), loyalty (Beauchamp 1999; 
Totter 1999; Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Trotter 2004), and solidarity (Childress et 
al. 2002; Garland and Stull 2003; Gostin 2005). In the context of an infectious disease 
outbreak like SARS or pandemic influenza, solidarity is a particularly important value for 
the health of the public (Singer et al. 2003; Gostin 2005; Kotalik 2005; JCB 2005). By 
utilizing these ethical values officials can tap into fundamental social values that are 
important for sustaining communities. These values will ensure community participation 
and incorporate fundamental social values in the development of pandemic plans. This 
will help to minimize conflicting obligations, inspire loyalty to response effort, and foster 
an attitude of solidarity in the community during the pandemic.   
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Participation 
During a pandemic the delivery of medical services will be paramount to reducing 
mortality as well as minimizing social unrest. In some emergencies particular social 
functions may be essential to prevent major disruptions in the delivery of critical services 
such as health care; however, to determine which social functions are essential “requires 
broad societal participation in order to reflect the values and priorities of affected 
populations” (Childress 2003, 89). The participation of community members in pandemic 
planning is essential in the development of the pandemic response plan that inspires 
loyalty and fosters solidarity during the response to a pandemic. 
It is often noted that effective disaster response planning requires community 
involvement (Schoch-Spana 2006; Childress 2003; Eckenwiler 2003; Kipnis 2003; Glass 
and Schoch-Spana 2002). Public participation is a matter of justice because the public has 
a right to participate in governmental decisions that impact life chances (Eckenwiler 
2003; Childress 2003). Creating opportunities for public participation expresses the equal 
value of all community members and is essential for building and maintaining public 
trust (Childress 2003). Furthermore, community involvement in decision-making is 
regarded as crucial for many organizations; as such, “officials operating in secrecy 
violate international consensus and tarnish ethical ideals” (Eckenwiler 2003, 126). The 
HHS plan notes, “studies have shown that the public will respond and cooperate more 
readily if they are involved directly in discussions and planning for future events” (2005, 
S10-15). Failure to involve the public as a key partner in the medical and public health 
response to an emergency could increase the likelihood of social disruption and hamper 
the management of the response (Glass and Schoch-Spana, 2002).  
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In order to develop community strategies for the delivery of health care during a 
pandemic it is vital to have representation from the medical community and the public. 
The American College of Physicians (ACP) recommends that all professional 
organizations of physicians, nurses, hospitals, and other health care workers participate in 
community taskforce for pandemic planning (ACP 2006). The American Public Health 
Association’s Principles of the Ethical Practice of Public Health states, “Public health 
policies, programs, and priorities should be developed and evaluated through processes 
that ensure an opportunity for input from community members” (Public Health 
Leadership Society 2002, 4).  
In public policy development a process known as “citizen engagement” is often 
used to involve citizens in the development and improvement of policy. Citizen 
engagement can be distinguished from the concept of participation in that participation is 
a broader concept intended to include engagement in the life of the community as well as 
in the lives of friends and neighbors. Citizen engagement is a more formal process and is 
akin to the concept of participatory development covered in more depth below. The term 
“participation” can be taken in a number of ways. The standard dictionary defines 
participation as first the act of participating, and second as a state of being related to the 
larger whole. A more encompassing definition reads as follows:  
Participation, which is expressed essentially in a series of activities by 
means of which the citizen, either as an individual or in association with 
others, whether directly or through representation, contributes to the 
cultural, economic, political and social life of the civil community to 
which he belongs. (PCJP 2005, 83) 
 
Participation requires an act on the part of an individual, group, or representative to 
engage in the activities that contribute to the life of the community in some civic, 
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cultural, political, or social way. Participation in the community is not only the 
opportunity for citizens to exercise freely their civic responsibilities with and for the 
community, but is also the pillar of democratic societies, which guarantees their 
permanence (PCJP 2005). 
 Citizen engagement is an interactive and iterative process between citizens and 
governments with the purpose of improving public policy decisions and their 
implementation (Schoch-Spana et al. 2006). Citizen engagement is essential to 
democratic societies because: 
(1) it provides evidence of citizen preferences to decision makers,  
(2) it creates legitimacy for public policies,  
(3) citizens’ skills and knowledge are developed through direct 
participation, and 
(4) civically engaged citizens can provide services that neither the state 
nor the market can. (Schoch-Spana et al. 2006, 314) 
 
Two citizen engagement projects for pandemic influenza planning include Citizen Voices 
on Pandemic Flu Choices: A Report of the Public Engagement Pilot Project on 
Pandemic Influenza (Keystone Center 2005), and The Public Engagement Project on 
Community Control Measures for Pandemic Influenza (Keystone Center 2007). These 
projects aim to engage citizens and stakeholders on the allocation of limited vaccine 
during a pandemic and the use of community containment measures, which includes 
closing schools and large day care facilities, canceling large public gatherings, 
encouraging sick persons to stay home, social distancing in the work environment, and 
self-quarantine. In regard to vaccine allocation the citizen group recommends 
establishing vaccination priorities that first assures the function of society, and second 
minimizes deaths and hospitalizations caused by influenza (Keystone Center 2005). In 
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regards to community containment measures, 95 percent or more of the citizens and 
stakeholders in the group support encouraging the ill to stay home, altering work patterns 
to maximize social distance, and canceling large public gathers; while 84 percent of the 
same group supports school closure and home quarantine of those exposed by sick 
household members (Keystone Center 2007).   
One means through which democratic societies engage the community in project 
development is through a process of participatory development, which is conceived and 
applied in at least two distinguishable ways: 
(a) Participation is considered a voluntary contribution by the people in one or 
another of the public programmes supposed to contribute to national 
development, but the people are not expected to take part in shaping the 
programme or criticizing its contents. (Parfitt 2004, 538) 
 
(b) Community participation [is] an active process by which beneficiary or 
client groups influence the direction and execution of a development 
project with a view to enhancing their well-being in terms of income, 
personal growth, self-reliance or other values they cherish. (Parfitt 2004, 
538) 
 
In the first definition participation is viewed as a means through which to mobilize people 
to realize predetermined objectives; while the second conception is viewed as an end 
inasmuch as it empowers people to define and pursue their own development activities 
(Parfitt 2004). When participation is viewed as a means, community involvement is 
viewed as a tool to assist in reaching particular goals. In this framework actual 
community members have little or no role in defining the objectives to which they are 
working towards. In this situation the government or development agency that frames the 
objectives or goals of the project are in a position of power. In the case of a pandemic, the 
government or health care institution that defines response strategies, without the 
  27 
assistance of the target audience, runs a risk of alienating the community it aims to 
benefit. When participation is viewed as an end, it has as one of its goals the 
empowerment of the target community. In a pandemic, when the implementation of 
response strategies depends upon the assistance of the community, the public will be 
more supportive if their input was part of the policy development process.  
One way to encourage community participation is to engage the community in 
defining roles, responsibilities, and expectations in the development of emergency health 
policy. A second way is by identifying and creating opportunities for individuals and 
groups to volunteer services and participate with the implementation of response 
strategies. A strategy that involves the public will build trust, confidence, and 
cooperation. Five guidelines that are useful for integrating the public into disaster 
response planning includes:  
(1) treat the public as a capable ally in the response to an epidemic,  
(2) enlist civic organizations in practical public health activities,  
(3) anticipate the need for home-based patient care and infection control,  
(4) invest in public outreach and communication strategies, and  
(5) ensure planning that reflects the values and priorities of affected populations. 
(Glass and Schoch-Spana 2002, 218)  
 
These guidelines can be useful to encourage participation in the community in three 
ways. First, these recommendations encourage participation in the planning process by 
engaging the public with outreach and communication strategies to incorporate values 
and priorities of the population. Second, they encourage participation on the individual 
level by including the public as an ally and resource for infection control. Third, they 
offer the opportunity to participate in the lives of neighbors and other community 
members by providing home-based patient care.  
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These strategies are useful in that they will inspire loyalty to a cause and foster 
solidarity in the community. The value of participation emphasizes the involvement of all 
groups and classes of people. Pandemic planners must ensure that the planning process is 
inclusive of all groups and that special steps are taken to address the needs of 
traditionally underserved and vulnerable populations such as the poor, minorities, and the 
elderly. A pandemic is a serious threat to the medical and public health infrastructure. 
Should these systems fail, the entire social infrastructure will be stressed. Pandemic 
planning must anticipate the possibility of these breakdowns and develop strategies, 
through a process of participatory development and citizen engagement, to inspire 
commitment among community members and develop the attitude that the community is 
unified in its response, for better or worse. 
 
Loyalty 
Individual loyalties ground personal commitments and actions more than abstract 
moral principles or laws. In times of a disaster it is often one’s loyalty to his community 
that determines his willingness to serve his community. While the cause of justice or 
peace may arouse devotion, the loyalty one has to fellow community members provides 
the moral force that inspires action. The American philosopher Josiah Royce regards 
loyalty as the fulfillment of the moral law; as such, loyalty is the central moral principle 
under which other moral concerns could be systematized (Kaurin 1999).  
Royce writes, “You can truthfully centre your entire moral world around a 
rational conception of loyalty. Justice, charity, industry, wisdom, spirituality are all 
definable in terms of enlightened loyalty” (Royce 2005, 860). Royce defines loyalty as 
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“the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause” (Royce 
2005, 861). There are several important points to recognize in this definition: Loyalty is 
voluntary, an individual chooses or accepts the cause to which he is loyal; it is a practical 
affair, it pertains to everyday life and is not constituted by an intellectual assent to 
abstract moral principles; and loyalty is thoroughgoing in that it permeates our lives in 
such a way that it defines one’s personal identity. Put in another way, “Loyalists are not 
content merely to pursue a cause; they breathe it” (Trotter 1999, 87). 
In general terms to be loyal means to stand by the object of loyalty and to regard 
obligations to that object as having primacy over obligations to objects that do not 
engender loyalty. The first things that come to mind when we speak of loyalty are 
obligation, commitment, and the willingness to lend aid and assistance to those belonging 
to us (Kinneging 2004). When a person has loyalty towards someone or some group, that 
person somehow comes to view the object of their loyalty as belonging to him. In general 
people care about the objects of their loyalties and will acknowledge obligations that they 
would not otherwise acknowledge (Oldenquist 1982). Loyalty implies a willingness to 
give up things one values, and perhaps the willingness to sacrifice one’s life if necessary 
(Kinneging 2004). However, as loyalty is directed towards those within distinct groups 
with special relationships, loyalty comes in degrees. People are generally more loyal to 
family members than strangers. James Rachels writes:  
We do not treat our family and friends as we would treat strangers. We are 
bound to them by love and affection, and we do things for them that we 
would not do for just anybody. But this is not merely a matter of being 
nicer to people we like. The nature of our relationships with family and 
friends is different from our relationships with other people, and part of 
the difference is that our duties and responsibilities are different. (2007, 
180) 
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As we are willing to do things for family and friends that we would not do for everyone, 
it appears that being loyal may involve the willingness not to follow good judgment, at 
least some of the time (Erwin 1992), which could lead people to take illegal actions, such 
as stealing or resorting to violence, in order to acquire resources for their family or 
friends during a pandemic. Furthermore, unlike objects of pure self-interests, loyalties 
can be shared or owned by many people; hence, people often speak of our family or our 
community (Oldenquist 1982). 
Loyalty appears to be related to the desire to be and remain with the group, which 
entails taking the interest of others as one’s own and being willing to bear some costs in 
the interest of the group (Erwin 1992). In a pandemic the interest of others within my 
family or group who need urgent medical treatment for influenza may outweigh my 
interest in receiving treatment for a mild case of illness. As such, I may forego seeking 
treatment for myself in order to secure treatment for others in my family or group. This 
immediately raises questions about the moral force of loyalty in regards to other groups. 
Is loyalty to one’s country as strong as one’s loyalty to one’s state or city? Does my 
community count more for me than a group to whom I have a weaker loyalty? Does 
loyalty require partiality towards my family to the neglect of the community, or my 
community to the neglect of the global community? One of the major challenges in 
planning for a pandemic is to balance private interest with public interest.  
In order to be loyal an individual (or community) must have some cause to which 
he is inspired. The cause of the loyalist is an “ideal that animates, nurtures, and helps 
define a human community” (Trotter 1999, 88). It is necessary to make a distinction 
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between the “object of loyalty” and the “cause of loyalty.” These terms are often used 
interchangeably and this is a source of confusion that will hinder our understanding of 
loyalty and its relation to a pandemic planning. The term “object of loyalty” refers to a 
particular group of people upon whom one’s loyalty is directed and focused. The term 
“cause of loyalty” is regarded as that which defines the object of loyalty, provides 
direction, and identifies values and actions. For example, a cause of loyalty will be a 
community’s response to a pandemic, which is articulated in the pandemic response plan. 
The cause of the pandemic response plan may be to mitigate the health consequences of a 
pandemic by maintaining health care services and providing care of the ill, while 
preserving conditions essential for human flourishing during the emergency. The object 
of this loyalty will consist of the community members, values, and actions particular to 
this community’s pandemic response plan.  
There are four qualities of a cause according to Royce: the personal, impersonal, 
superpersonal, and superindividual. The first quality of a cause is that it appeals to 
individuals on a personal level and results in action. Royce writes: “If one is loyal, he has 
a cause which he indeed personally values. Otherwise, how could he be devoted to it? He 
therefore takes interest in the cause, loves it, is well pleased with it” (Royce 2005, 862). 
When a person adopts a cause he personally values, he must then develop the manner in 
which he will integrate his behaviors to serve that cause (Trotter 1999). If a person finds 
no value or interest in a potential cause then it is difficult to serve that cause. No cause 
can orient a loyal commitment among a group if it is rooted only in personal desires 
(Tollefsen 2000). 
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A cause of loyalty is something an individual must personally value and take 
interest in, but loyalty is never mere emotion (Royce 2005). Emotional states may 
accompany loyalty, but they do not constitute it because it is the cause, and not personal 
impulses, that direct and focus one’s loyalty (Kaurin 1999). This indicates that loyalty 
requires self-control and implies that the cause of loyalty must also be impersonal. Royce 
writes:   
On the other hand, loyalty never means the mere emotion of love for your 
cause, and never means merely following your own pleasure, viewed as 
private pleasure and interest, it is still much larger than your private self. It 
has its own value, (so you believe) even if your private interest were left 
out of account. Your cause you take, then, to be something objective, 
something that is not your private self. (Royce 2005, 862) 
 
Because a cause is “larger than your private self” it must also be impersonal. The 
individual cannot be guided only by personal interests or emotion, but must keep the 
ideals of the cause in view. Like the common good, the cause of the community 
pandemic response plan is focused on the good of the community. Furthermore, because 
the cause of the pandemic response transcends individual interests and is shared by a 
group, it is also impersonal. It is this impersonal aspect of loyalty that suggests 
individuals keep the common good in view, and this may entail sacrificing personal 
interest for the sake of the cause.  
As a consequence of the pandemic, medical resources and other important goods 
may be in short supply, and community members may need to sacrifice personal interests 
for the cause by rationing and reallocating essential goods for the benefit of the 
community. Because the cause of a pandemic response concerns the community, 
individual interests and desires may become secondary to the cause. This does not mean 
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that personal interests are not valuable, but that the cause is larger than any one individual 
and will persist even if some die. This does not entail that a person neglects obligations to 
family or other natural loyalties, but that individuals balance their service to the cause of 
the pandemic response with personal obligations. Simply because one’s strongest 
obligations are associated with natural loyalties does not mean that personal sacrifices are 
always unnecessary for the good of the community, especially if the harm to be avoided 
or the good achieved is great (Oldenquist 1982).    
Because a cause must also be superpersonal, it must extend beyond the individual 
to include values and interests of others united for the same cause. It is in the 
superpersonal quality of a cause that Royce rejects the view that the individual is 
sovereign over the good (Tollefsen 2000). Royce writes: 
Moreover, the cause to which a loyal man is devoted is never something 
wholly impersonal. It concerns other men. Loyalty is social. If one is a 
loyal servant of a cause, one has at least possible fellow-servants. On the 
other hand, since a cause, in general, tends to unite the many fellow-
servants in one service, it consequently seems to the loyal man to have a 
sort of impersonal or superpersonal quality about it. (Royce 2005, 862) 
 
It is the superpersonal aspects of loyalty that allows Royce to speak of “servants” and 
“fellow–servants” united in service to a cause (Tollefsen 2000). The superpersonal aspect 
of loyalty binds many lives in one service and regards the interests of fellow servants as 
essential, because to live for the unity of the group requires that one must necessarily 
consider the values and interests of others. There is value in a cause that transcends 
private interests because many individuals will be brought together in service. 
Subsequently, a key element of solidarity is the unity of the group for the sake of the 
group.  
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The final aspect of a cause of loyalty according to Royce is the superindividual.  
As Royce points out, one can love an individual but only be loyal through a tie that binds 
one with others in some sort of unity:   
The cause to which loyalty devotes itself has always this union of the 
personal and the seemingly superindividual about it. It binds many 
individuals into one service. Loyal lovers, for instance, are loyal not 
merely to one another as separate individuals, but to their love, to their 
union, which is something more than either of them, or even than both of 
them viewed as distinct individuals. (Royce 2005, 862) 
 
The analogy of lovers illustrates the superindividual aspect of loyalty well. The lovers are 
not simply devoted to one another, but also to their union, their relationship; two 
individual lives committed to the service of one cause. A marriage displays all four 
qualities of a cause; it is personal, impersonal, superpersonal and superindividual.  
It is the combination of these four qualities of a cause that constitute the 
objectivity of loyalty in Royce’s account. A good cause is personally appealing, 
transcends private interest, regards the interest of others, and unites many in the service 
of one cause. These are qualities that can be used to test the value of any particular cause.  
A good cause to which people are loyal is one that helps them progress towards an ideal 
of a great community, and in order to function in this way a cause must be tangible and 
grounded in reality; otherwise it will not be compelling (Trotter 1999). The cause of the 
pandemic response plan must be one that provides a unified response. A well-defined 
pandemic response plan will clearly articulate the cause and the actions necessary to 
serve the cause. While the cause of the pandemic response is critical for a unified 
response, the loyalty a person has to his loved ones remains the force that grounds a 
moral commitment to the cause.  
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Loyalty can thus be a source of conflict during an emergency. In pandemic 
planning there exists the danger of creating response policies that unnecessarily infringe 
upon loyalties, creating conflicts between loyalties. A policy that pits employee against 
employer, citizen against government, or neighbor against neighbor will create a conflict 
between loyalties that could potentially alienate those who are necessary to carry out the 
response effort. If those who are capable of responding to the emergency are unwilling to 
serve, then countless others who depend upon their assistance will suffer. For example, a 
policy that forces a person to choose between her family and employment is an 
unsatisfactory policy that should be reconsidered. When the health and safety of family 
members are at stake, people are naturally more concerned with their own family than 
with other obligations. Partiality is a consequence of loyalty and cannot be readily 
dismissed: 
To suggest that taking care of “our own” or showing partiality towards 
those closest to us, is wrong, according to many, is not only 
counterintuitive; it would also seem to make our lives as social beings 
colder and less colorful, devoid of ground projects and caring relationships 
that, in a profound sense, constitute who we are as persons. (Eckenwiler 
2003, 117) 
 
However, if all people practice partiality, then the distribution of resources would lead to 
the fulfillment of some people and not all. One way to confront the issue of partiality is to 
“consider ways in which one’s partiality creates or perpetuates harm, and what might be 
done to mitigate this” (Eckenwiler 2003, 117). 
The conception of community loyalty does not imply “my community, right or 
wrong” because loyalty determines obligations only prima facie (Kinneging 2004). As 
such, loyalty cannot be a categorical imperative, an absolute requirement applied 
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universally, because there are limits to one’s duty to be loyal. A person cannot be loyal to 
all groups or good causes. For instance, sometimes national or community goods may 
compete with the good of one’s family. The former demands impartiality between family 
and non-family for the sake of the greatest good for the greatest number of people; 
however, this is simply a call to embrace a wider loyalty from a utilitarian perspective 
(Oldenquist 1982). Utilitarianism espouses the greatest amount of happiness for the 
greatest number of people with strict impartiality to individual happiness or biases. John 
Stuart Mill writes: 
That the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in 
conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As 
between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him 
to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. 
(2003, 70) 
  
As such the utilitarian perspective does not regard family loyalties as privileged. If many 
people in a community are in need, the utilitarian perspective requires a distribution of 
goods that are calculated to produce the greatest amount of good for the community. 
However, if family loyalties are biases, so too are utilitarian claims advocating the 
greatest good for greatest number of people (Oldenquist 1982).  
It is not obvious that wider loyalties have moral force over natural loyalties. If we 
are compelled to look beyond our families to the greatest good for the greatest number by 
embracing impartiality, it is not clear that this forced shift to the wider society, a weaker 
loyalty, will result in strong moral commitments. Furthermore, it is not clear that this 
shift would result in the realization of the greatest good for the greatest number. Moral 
concern for all of humanity is diluted and much too weak to compete with natural 
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loyalties such as those to one’s family (Oldenquist 1982). Perhaps, adhering to one’s 
strongest loyalties first would result in a greatest good for the whole. 
Both good and harm come in degrees, and thus individuals, groups, and 
communities must balance loyalties when conflicts arise. To balance loyalties one must 
consider benefits, burdens, harms, and risks, as well as duties towards family and 
community. The principle that Royce suggests to address conflicts between loyalties is 
the ideal of loyalty to loyalty. The principle of loyalty to loyalty is an ideal of harmony 
between all possible loyalties (Tollefsen 2000). Royce writes:  
In so far as it lies in your power, so choose your cause and so serve it, that 
by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty 
in the world rather than less. And, in fact, so choose and so serve your 
individual cause as to secure thereby the greatest possible increase of 
loyalty amongst men. (2005, 902) 
 
For Royce the ultimate ideal that animates a community should be one that inspires 
loyalty in others. Griffin Trotter notes that loyalty to loyalty can be alternatively 
expressed as loyalty to the great community (1997). However, this principle is an attempt 
to reconcile the partiality of loyalty with the impartiality of a universalizable ethics. 
Loyalty to loyalty is a formal notion that requires content in particular cases, so the 
questions arise: What causes are consistent with loyalty to loyalty, and what social 
institutions embody legitimate causes, and what type of pandemic response strategies are 
conducive to solidarity? 
 
Solidarity  
The term “solidarity” is often associated with the Polish workers’ movement that 
led to the foundation of the Polish Trade Union Federation in 1980. This movement 
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advocated for workers’ rights and nonviolence. Steiner Stjerno defines solidarity in 
Europe as: “The preparedness to share resources with others by personal contribution to 
those in struggle or in need” (2004, 2). Solidarity is based on shared norms, a 
commitment to collective goals, and the maintenance of a system of differentiated roles 
(DeMarco 2003). Solidarity is rooted in the social nature of human beings and stems 
from the fact that humans live and act together to form communities and fulfill their 
social nature. Aristotle observes, “every community is established with a view to some 
good; for mankind always acts in order to obtain that which they think good” (Aristotle 
2001, 1252a-b). Without a minimal level of solidarity families, communities, and social 
institutions would not form and humans would simply not flourish. In a basic sense the 
value of life and community and the pursuit of happiness are fundamental to flourishing 
in all people in all cultures.   
Solidarity is concerned with all members of a group and may require an 
unwillingness to receive benefits unless others in the group do as well, or an 
unwillingness to receive a benefit when this benefit harms others in the group (Mason 
1998). Many regard solidarity as an important political ideal that emphasizes community 
and promotes social cohesion and stability (Mason 1998). However, the term has a 
deeper meaning that extends beyond the typical political usage:  
Solidarity is … not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at 
the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is 
a firm and preserving determination to commit oneself to the common 
good. (PCJP 2005, 85) 
 
In this definition solidarity is not grounded in emotions, nor is it simply a feeling of 
sympathy for others suffering hardship. It is a conscious decision to commit oneself to 
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the common good. As solidarity is directed towards the common good and is found in the 
commitment to the good of one’s neighbor, it rises to the rank of a social virtue (PCJP 
2005, 85). As a virtue it is more than a moral principle, it is a condition that must be 
nurtured and developed in the activities of one’s life and in the life of the community.  
A virtue is “an aptitude productive of the best actions,” and, according to Aristotle, “the 
virtue of a human being would be the active condition from which one becomes a good 
human being and from which one will yield up one’s own work well” (2002, 1106a-b).  
 As a social virtue, solidarity is concerned with the active condition that allows the 
community to achieve its fulfillment. Wojtyla writes: 
The attitude of solidarity is, so to speak, the natural consequence of the 
fact that human beings live and act together; it is the attitude of a 
community, in which the common good properly conditions and initiates 
participation, and participation in turn properly serves the common good, 
fosters it, and furthers its realization. (1979, 285) 
  
There are three important aspects of this characterization: first, the social character of 
solidarity arises from the fact that humans live and act together; second, solidarity is an 
attitude of a community; and third, the common good conditions participation, which in 
turn serves the common good. Solidarity relates to the social nature of human beings with 
an “affirmation of the bonds” shared between them (Sirico, 2001). These “bonds” stem 
from the recognition that human beings share a common humanity that develops in 
concert with others who live and act together for the common good. In other words, 
solidarity stems from the meaning of membership in a community (Walzer 1999), which 
arises from a “sense of belonging” and “expresses itself in loyalty and self sacrifice for 
those we acknowledge to be one of us” (Garland and Stull 2003, 244). 
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 In order to appreciate the social nature of solidarity and how it relates to pandemic 
planning, it is necessary to an understanding of the common good. The CDC’s document 
“Ethical Guidelines in Pandemic Influenza” notes: 
the common good refers to interest of a group or collective that is defined 
by having in common certain attributes (e.g. location in a geographically-
defined community, risk of a specific disease) that create a commonality 
of interest. (CDC 2007, 4) 
 
The use of the term common good in the context of pandemic influenza reflects an 
understanding that all human beings are part of a single collective that has a common 
good (CDC 2007), which suggests there is a fundamental set of conditions to which all 
people and groups have an interest in preserving. Fundamental conditions that make up 
the common good include the conditions necessary for bodily health such as provisions 
for nutrition. The development and sustainability of the conditions necessary for the 
provisions of nutrition requires the collective effort of the community. In this way, the 
common good is viewed as the contribution of society, which is necessary for the good of 
the individual (Finnis 1980; Trotter 2004).  
The concept of the common good is complex and contains many elements; 
furthermore, its concrete form changes as social conditions change, as in war or natural 
disasters (Gallagher 1995). In a public health emergency or disaster, a community will 
become focused on particular goals that result from a substantial threat to its survival 
(Childress 2003). A focused community transforms the common good from something 
indeterminate and vague (Atkins 2005) to something more narrowly defined. In the 
context of a pandemic emergency the common good may be objectively defined to 
consist of the general conditions necessary for the survival of the community. These 
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conditions for human flourishing can be categorized according to their importance for 
human survival. Conditions for physiological survival, such as food, water, and basic 
health care needs can be prioritized over education and recreation during an emergency.  
The conception of solidarity developed by Wojtyla 4 stems from his understanding 
of participation, which brings into focus the humanity of others (DeMarco 2003). From 
this understanding solidarity is simply the “virtue of care as extended to all other people 
in society” (DeMarco 2003.). Wojtyla understands participation to express the personal 
value of our actions as we exist and act together with others in different systems of social 
life (Wojtyla 1993).  In one sense participation is “the ability of human beings to endow 
their existence and activity with a personal (personalistic) dimension when they exist and 
act together with others” (Wojtyla 1993, 237). In this sense there is a notion of an 
elevated person, an individual who is not obscured by the community, but along with 
other unique community members comprises it (Fernandes 2001). In the second sense 
participation is viewed as relational and emphasizes a positive relation to the humanity of 
others by indicating that self-interest is complemented by an interest in a neighbor’s good 
(Fernandes 2001). Because actions performed by a person are performed with others or 
for others, Wojtyla’s notion of participation is value laden (Schmitz 1993).  
According to Wojtyla, to embrace the attitude of solidarity means that the 
individual is ready to accept and realize one’s role in support of the good of the 
community precisely because that individual is part of a the community and has the 
                                                 
4
  Karol Wojtyla’s thought is influenced by a discipline in philosophy known as phenomenology, which was 
principally initiated by Edmund Husserl around the beginning of the twentieth century. Wojtyla is 
particularity indebted to a form of phenomenology developed by Max Scheler. For more on the 
philosophical influences on Wojtyla, see Kenneth L. Schmitz. 1993. At the Center of the Human Drama: 
The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II. Washington D.C., Catholic 
University of America Press. 
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common good in view (Wojtyla 1979). It is in the awareness of the common good that 
allows the individual to look beyond her own share to the benefit of the whole. However, 
there exist situations in social life where individuals may be demoralized to the point of 
withdrawal and they focus strictly on their own needs and duties. This withdrawal from 
community life is essentially contrary to the attitude of solidarity. The possibility of such 
a retreat indicates that within the attitude of solidarity there must remain the reference to 
the common good; “it must dominate to the extent that it allows one to know when it is 
necessary to take over more than one’s usual share in acting and responsibility” (Wojtyla 
1979, 285).   
During a pandemic there will likely be moments when it is necessary for 
community members to take on additional labors in support the response effort.  It is in 
reference to the common good that every individual “member of the community has to be 
ready to ‘complement’ by his action what is done by other members of the community” 
(Wojtyla 1979). “Mutual complementariness” is an essential element in the nature of 
participation and is why in the attitude of solidarity we see “an intrinsic manifestation of 
participation as a feature of the person” (Wojtyla 1979). The commitment of solidarity to 
the well-being of others can be conceived in “terms of the recognition of special 
obligations between the members of a group which exist in virtue of their being 
members” (Mason 1998). During the pandemic an attitude of solidarity in the community 
will assist in providing a coordinated and cohesive response effort. This will assist in 
alleviating some of the burdens on health care workers and the health care system 
providing care for the ill. 
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Chapter 3: Towards and Ethical Approach to Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
 
Does any of us, knowing our own human vulnerability to disease and 
death, prefer to live in a society that provides healthcare to people with 
infectious diseases, or in a society that leaves epidemics to run their course 
and devastate the population, or in a society that practices a form of 
quarantining of the ill without treatment, leaving them to die in isolation? 
(Reid, 2005)  
 
Duty to Care 
During a pandemic one of the greatest challenges to society will be providing care 
for the ill. Not only will there be large numbers of people ill with influenza, there will 
continue to be people who need emergency medical care and long-term care for life 
threatening injuries, acute diseases, and chronic conditions such as cancer, kidney 
disease, and HIV/AIDS. Participation, loyalty, and solidarity are important values for 
pandemic planning that are conducive to developing response strategies for providing 
care to the ill. A related and equally important value in the context of pandemic planning 
is the “duty to care” during an infectious disease outbreak. The values of participation, 
loyalty, and solidarity underscore the social character of pandemic planning and response 
and indicate there is a fundamental duty upon society to provide care to the ill during a 
pandemic.  
The duty to provide care during an infectious disease outbreak has recently 
emerged as a matter of concern among health care professionals, public policy makers, 
and bioethicists (Ruderman et al. 2006; Sokol 2006; JCB 2005; Clark 2005; Reid 2005; 
Singer et al. 2003). It is estimated that 30 percent of reported SARS cases were among 
health care workers, some of whom died as a result (Ruderman et al. 2006). The SARS-
related fatalities of workers occupationally exposed to infection highlight the basis of fear 
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that employees have regarding potentially fatal infectious diseases (Qureshi et al. 2005). 
For example, paramedics and janitorial staff served and died along with physicians and 
nurses during the SARS outbreak (Reid 2005). The term duty to care is problematic 
because it is vague at best, and ethically dangerous at worst (Sokol 2006). The phrase 
was often used in Toronto during the SARS outbreak as a self-standing argument for the 
involvement of health care workers in the response effort, but without a critical 
examination, thus “giving the illusion of legitimate moral justification” (Sokol 2006, 
1238). 
During a pandemic primary care and emergency service workers will be the first 
responders to face the outbreak and will therefore face a disproportionate risk compared 
to other health care workers; however, there will likely be pressure on other health care 
providers to assist in the response (JCB 2005). In addition to health care workers there 
will be a need for administrative, janitorial, and other support staff to maintain the 
functioning of the health care system. In this way the question expands from the 
obligations of health care professionals, to the obligations of general health care workers 
and support staff to report for duty and to support the delivery of care. This is more 
complicated as many health care workers and support staffs do not enjoy privileged 
social status, do not take oaths, or have particular codes of ethics. So what obligation do 
these workers have to report to duty in a health care setting during an infectious disease 
outbreak? 
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Willingness and Ability to Provide Care 
While it might be assumed that health care workers have an obligation to respond 
during a disaster or public health emergency, this assumption may be challenged in an 
actual event. For example, 25 nurses were fired or suspended for not reporting to work or 
for leaving early during Hurricane Francis in 2004 (Qureshi et al. 2005). Likewise, some 
health care workers either quit their jobs or were fired during the SARS outbreak 
(Ruderman et al. 2006; Sokol 2006). The risk involved in responding to an infectious 
disease outbreak like pandemic influenza is more pronounced than a trauma disaster, 
because health care workers are vulnerable to an infection that they may pass on to their 
family, friends, and community.  
A recent study of school nurses found that the willingness to provide care for 
patients during an outbreak of smallpox, SARS, or other deadly illness was generally low 
(Qureshi, Merrill, and Calero-Breckheimer 2002). A similar study reported that 80 
percent of physicians indicated they would continue to treat patients in the event of an 
outbreak of an unknown but potentially deadly illness, but only 33 percent reported a 
willingness to treat if left unvaccinated against a highly contagious and lethal disease like 
smallpox (Alexander and Wynia 2003). In this same study only a narrow majority of 
physicians reported believing in a professional duty to treat patients in epidemics; the 
authors of the study conclude that there should be more emphasis on the medical 
profession’s ethical duty to treat in the event of a public health emergency (Alexander 
and Wynia 2003).  
A recent study of local health department workers indicates that nearly half of 
them are not likely to report to duty during a pandemic (Balicer, Huerta, and Grotto 
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2006). In this study, the greatest factor influencing willingness to report for duty was the 
perception of the importance of their role in the overall response (Balicer, Huerta, and 
Grotto 2006). This appears to suggest that local health department workers may be 
willing to face some risks if they perceive their role as important. Additional research 
indicates that health care workers’ willingness to report for duty increases if personal 
protective measures are provided (Qureshi et al. 2005). What these studies indicate is that 
the perception of risk, the importance of their role in the response, and the degree to 
which protective measures can be offered influences the health care workers’ willingness 
to respond to an infectious disease outbreak.  
During a disaster or public health emergency some health care workers may wish 
to serve but cannot due to competing obligations and other external factors. A study of 
health care workers’ response to disaster events notes that while some were willing to 
report to duty, many were unable due to outside constraints (Qureshi et al., 2005). When 
respondents were asked why they were not able to report for duty the most frequently 
reported reasons were transportation, child care, and personal health concerns; while the 
most frequently cited reasons for not being willing to report were fear and concern for 
their family (Qureshi, Merrill, and Calero-Breckheimer 2002; Qureshi et al. 2005). 
Infectious diseases have long been a clinical reality in underdeveloped countries and are 
becoming a clinical reality in developed countries. The relative silence of codes of ethics 
on the duty to provide care during an infectious disease emergency is problematic 
normatively and clinically (Ruderman et al. 2006). 
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Duty and the Physicians’ Code of Ethics 
Historical accounts in times of epidemics such as Philadelphia Yellow Fever 
(1793), cholera (19th century), and influenza (1918), reveal a spectrum of physician 
conduct from heroism and altruism to fear and retreat (Olick 2004b). In the broad sweep 
of medical history, from early Greece to the present day, there is no consistent medical 
tradition regarding physicians and the personal risk they are obliged to face (Clarke 
2005). One place health care workers can look for guidance on their professional 
obligations is in their respective codes of ethics. Codes of ethics should be interpreted as 
guides for ethical reasoning and frameworks for treatment, rather than absolute mandates 
or substitutes for reasoning (Ruderman et al., 2006).  
The 1847 American Medical Association’s (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics 
pronounced that physicians should face the dangers of pestilence even at the risk of 
death; however, contemporary iterations of the Code retreat from these high ideals and 
emphasize physicians’ autonomy to choose patients, except in emergencies (Olick 
2004b). Currently, the AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics states, “A physician shall, in 
the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom 
to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical care” 
(2001, VI).  
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The current AMA opinion on professional rights and responsibilities includes the 
declaration on “Physician Obligation in Disaster Preparedness and Response,” which 
states:  
National, regional, and local responses to epidemics, terrorist attacks, and 
other disasters require extensive involvement of physicians. Because of 
their commitment to care for the sick and injured, individual physicians 
have an obligation to provide urgent medical care during disasters. This 
ethical obligation holds even in the face of greater than usual risk to their 
own safety, health or life. The physician workforce, however, is not an 
unlimited resource; therefore, when participating in disaster responses, 
physicians should balance immediate benefits to individual patients with 
the ability to care for patients in the future. (2004, E-9.067) 
 
This declaration, which is less authoritative than the Code of Ethics, calls on physicians 
to affirm a social contract to accept an undefined degree of risk in service to humanity 
(Olick 2004b). Once it is allowed that broader societal emergencies sometimes trump 
physicians’ autonomy rights, the question shifts from “whether or not” a physician is 
obligated to provide care during an emergency to a question of “when and to what 
extent” (Clarke 2005, 68). While a duty to provide care and respond to suffering is 
inherent to all codes of ethics for health care professionals, these workers still have to 
weigh the demands of competing obligations (JCB 2005). However, “by making explicit 
the values that health care professions represent, professional codes of ethics can reassure 
the public that the trust invested in the professions is justified and legitimate” (Ruderman 
2006).  
 
Duty and Risks 
During a pandemic many health care professionals will be called upon to serve. 
The American Public Health Association’s Code of Ethics expresses a moral 
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commitment to patient and community welfare, but offers little guidance on the issue of 
professional duties to assume risk beyond the scope of normal occupational risk (Olick 
2004b). Emergency physicians, however, profess a commitment to “an ethical duty to 
respond” to disasters as a special resource in the community, which is not qualified by the 
degree of personal risk (Olick 2004b). Formal statements on professional obligations 
reveal that personal health risks are an important countervailing consideration. In the 
framework of the HIV/AIDS debate, obligation sinks with higher levels of risk and there 
is a level of risk at which the duty to care no longer holds (Reid 2005; Olick 2004b). For 
example the AMA’s early response to physicians’ fears of HIV/AIDS was to require 
physicians to treat HIV/AIDS patients only if the physician was “emotionally able to do 
so” (Clarke 2005, 71). However, after immediate ridicule the AMA issued a new 
statement asserting that, “A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose 
condition is within the physician’s current realm of competence solely because the patient 
is seropositive” (Clarke 2005, 71). Similarly, in the early years of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, the American Nurses’ Association emphasized a “special” duty not to “walk 
away from those in need” with the provision that care should not “present more than 
minimal risk to the health care provider” (Olick 2004b, 366). 
It can be argued that health care professionals should pursue their duties even at 
the potential cost to their own lives, because other professionals such as firefighters or 
police officers do not have the freedom to choose not to face a bad fire or a dangerous 
criminal (JCB 2005). The argument that health care professionals have a duty to provide 
care under significant risk is based on several factors: (1) as their ability to render aid is 
great so is their obligation to assist; (2) by freely joining a profession that combats 
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disease, medical professionals consent to accepting some standard of risk; and (3) the 
profession has flourished under a socially negotiated promise to be available in times of 
duress (Clarke 2005). For example, if I am trained in water safety and rescue, my duty to 
assist a drowning victim is greater than the average swimmer on the beach, because my 
training in water rescue techniques reduces my personal risk (Clarke 2005).  
However, there still may exist situations in which lifeguards, firefighters, police 
officers, and health professionals may face an unreasonable risk that does not require 
service. For example, a lifeguard is not expected to attempt to rescue a distressed 
swimmer who is a mile off shore and surrounded by tiger sharks. In this situation the risk 
is unreasonable as the rescue attempt would likely result in the death of both the rescuer 
and the distressed swimmer. The analogy of the lifeguard helps to illustrate that 
physicians’ prima facie duty to care can be trumped under extraordinary circumstances.  
By freely choosing to pursue an occupation to combat disease, health care 
professionals willingly accept some level of risks as an occupational hazard. For 
example, a physician who accepts a post in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) will incur more risk than a physician in London, England because the diseases in 
the DRC are many and the medical facilities are few (Sokol 2006). Typically, health care 
workers who accept such dangerous posts are aware of the risk and thus accept this risk 
as a professional liability. However, the limits on the duty to provide care are often a 
function of normal risk. The question of newly emerging virulent diseases forces health 
care workers to examine the limit of acceptable risk and their professional obligation to 
provide care.  
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During a pandemic the duty to provide care may hinge on what levels of risk we 
as a society are prepared to ask individuals to suffer and what levels of risk we are 
willing to accept. During the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1980’s and the 2003 SARS 
outbreak in Canada, some physicians and nurses refused to care for infected patients on 
the grounds that the danger was too great (Sokol 2006). However, even if one 
understands the relationship between risk and obligation as proportionate, as in the 
HIV/AIDS debate, the most remarkable feature of the SARS outbreak was that health 
care professionals, by and large, did not abandon their posts even though there was strong 
evidence of significant risks of illness and death (Reid 2005).  
 
Duty and Society 
The social contract between health care professionals and society calls on health 
care professionals to be available in times of emergency (JCB 2005). However, to regard 
the duty to care as a matter of individual moral commitments ignores the responsibility 
we all share to maintain the infrastructure that supports health care workers in fulfilling 
their duties (Reid 2005). The advantage of approaching the duty to care in terms of a 
broad social contract is that it involves all people, organizations, and institutions who are 
necessary to support and maintain the delivery of health services (Reid 2005). Calls for 
extending benefits, such as hazard pay and enhanced disability insurance, could be 
justified if health care professionals expressed a strong commitment to an ethical duty to 
care during public health emergencies; however, without such a commitment, additional 
measures to protect and safeguard health care workers would appear misplaced and self-
serving (Ruderman et al. 2006).  
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While physicians are part of the medical community they are also part of the 
broader community and have multiple roles and duties, such as doctor, spouse, and 
parent; thus, defining the limits of the duty to care must account for the strength of 
competing rights and duties (Sokol 2006). Health care professionals, pandemic planners, 
and the general public should participate in discussions to determine whether and when it 
is legitimate to shun the duty to care in the face of personal risk (Ruderman et al. 2006; 
Sokol 2006). The duty to care is not based on particular virtues of the health profession, 
but from social reflection on our shared vulnerability to disease and death, and what types 
of response to epidemics would be consistent with our needs and values (Reid 2005). In 
the SARS epidemic the approximate ideal was to provide medical care for all who fell ill 
(Reid 2005). If our ideal is to provide care for everyone who is ill, then a critical 
examination of the role of health care workers is necessary to provide guidelines on 
professional responsibilities and public expectations (Ruderman et al. 2006). 
The SARS epidemic raised the question: If not me, then who? (Reid 2005). If the 
duty to provide care is cast strictly as altruism, then the association of a duty to care with 
altruism masks moral conflicts between various parties to whom a person may owe care; 
and it also interferes with the health care workers’ need to accept that they must take 
protective measures that are consistent with the social need to maintain the functioning of 
the system during a pandemic (Reid 2005). Providing care to the ill during a pandemic 
raises many social questions: 1) What is our ideal of care during an outbreak? 2) What 
levels of risks are we willing to accept for health care workers and support staff? 3) How 
will we protect our health care workers and support staff providing care for the ill? 4) 
How will we assist health care workers, support staff, and their families when competing 
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obligations arise? Self sacrifice and moral heroism by a few individuals is not sufficient 
to create and sustain a health care system that will provide care for the ill during a 
pandemic: the “obligation is on all of us” (Reid 2005, 359).  
 
Participation and Pandemic Planning 
A perennial question in ethics is: what human capacity grounds our ability to 
think and act as moral agents? Why do people respond to suffering in others? Is the moral 
response to suffering grounded in rationality or emotion? Lisa Eckenwiler asks: 
What motivated emergency health workers who were officially off duty 
after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and 
countless health professionals from around the country to come forward 
voluntarily to help? Did they reason that this was the right course of action 
or were they acting also from emotion? (2003, 15) 
 
Perhaps the spirit of loyalty and solidarity motivated emergency responders and 
volunteers to come forward in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Certainly 
many responders understood that this was a worthy cause that united many Americans 
into one service. Moreover, as these attacks were conducted in the United States, many 
people found a personal interest (personal) in the cause. The response to September 11th 
was a social endeavor (impersonal) that was larger than the individual response 
(superpersonal), and it bound many responders into a unity of service (superindividual). 
First responders and volunteers put aside self-interest and made personal sacrifices to 
assist those in need after the attacks. During the response to 9/11, Americans came 
together in solidarity to work for the common good.  
In order to develop loyalty and solidarity within the community for a pandemic 
response, it is crucial that pandemic planners use participatory processes in the 
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development of the plan, and citizen engagement projects for the validation of pandemic 
policies. The public should be engaged in discussions about the various roles, 
responsibilities, and expectations for government officials, first responders, health care 
workers and volunteers, critical infrastructure workers, faith-based organizations, 
community volunteer groups, and individuals. This includes discussions to define societal 
expectations regarding altered standards of care, the obligations of health care workers to 
provide care for the ill, the limits of acceptable risk during an infectious disease outbreak, 
community containment strategies, and reciprocal obligations on the part of the 
government, health care institutions, and the community.  
The community can participate in participatory development processes to assist in 
defining responsibilities, community containment measures, and response strategies. 
Community members can assist in devising strategies that cannot be feasibly 
implemented by government organizations, such as support for home isolation and 
quarantine, home-based care for the non-critically ill, palliative care for the dying, child 
care services, delivery of medical resources, and law enforcement activities. Community 
strategies may include developing neighborhood networks to provide food, medical 
resources, security, and supportive care. All pandemic policies and response strategies 
that include public participation in the development stages will help to create a sense of 
ownership or loyalty to the plan and will assist in developing an attitude of solidarity 
during the implementation of the plan. 
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Loyalty   
  The concept of loyalty is important for pandemic preparedness and response. 
First, loyalty offers hope in that a well-defined and inclusive pandemic response plan 
offers the community a cause to which they can serve. If the pandemic response plan is 
not personal, impersonal, superpersonal, and superindividual, then it lacks the qualities 
that make it relevant and compelling. If the plan is not personally interesting, if it tends to 
disregard the interest of others and divides people, then the cause of loyalty will be 
effectively damaged. Second, loyalties account for a major source of conflict that may 
inhibit ones willingness to participate in the response effort. Pandemic response strategies 
should be examined for potential conflicts between loyalties that will inhibit the 
implementation of the plan. By examining loyalty as a source of conflict, community 
planners can devise response strategies that minimize conflicts and offers realistic 
alternatives to serve the cause.  
In addition to conflicts with family and social obligations, health care workers 
will face conflicts of loyalty in the fulfillment of their professional obligations to their 
patients. During a pandemic it may be necessary for physicians, nurses, and other health 
care workers leave the besides of their individual patients to attend to the needs of many 
patients. Ordinarily, professional loyalty for the health care workers is conceived as 
giving the patient’s interest priority in two respects:  
(1) the professional effaces self-interest in any situation that may conflict 
with the patient’s interest, and  
(2) the professional favors the patient’s interest over others. (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2001, 313)  
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However, during times of disaster or war, the care of patients may conflict with 
institutional or state objectives and patients’ needs may not take precedence (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2001). During a public health emergency physicians’ responsibilities to the 
common good supersedes responsibilities to individual patients (Trotter 1999, 2004; Lo 
and Katz 2005). When physicians are faced with a conflict between a patients’ 
preferences and community interests, “physicians should act in the spirit of loyalty” 
(Trotter 1999, 96).  
While physicians “should acknowledge their primary role as beneficiaries and 
advocates for individual patients,” (Trotter 1999, 96) loyalty may demand that they “act 
against the immediate preferences of established patients” (Trotter 1999, 95). If a narrow 
view of beneficence conceived as serving individual patients’ preferences leads to a 
conflict with loyalty to the community, then the broader, higher loyalty takes priority. In 
these situations “the art of loyalty requires more than applying a formula” (Trotter 1999, 
96). During a pandemic health professionals should look to the higher cause of the 
pandemic response plan to guide clinical decision regarding the care of patients. If 
clinical guidance on triage, patient care, and resource allocation exists, they should 
consult this guidance; however, when ambiguous situations arise during the disaster 
health care workers will have to rely on their professional and moral competencies to 
determine the right course of action under the circumstances.  
When conflicts are recognized in pandemic response strategies, the principle of 
loyalty to loyalty should be considered. The principle of loyalty to loyalty indicates that 
one should attempt to increase loyalty in the world. According to this principle, pandemic 
response strategies must aim to increase loyalty and minimize damaging loyalty in others. 
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A public health policy or pandemic response strategy that forbids the expression of 
loyalty within and among natural communities5 is an intervention that may alienate 
individuals and groups and polarize a community, which will be detrimental to the 
response effort during a pandemic.  
One critical aspect of the principle of loyalty to loyalty relevant to a pandemic is 
that it requires decisiveness and firm resolve to act. Royce describes the principle of 
loyalty to loyalty: 
It commands simply but imperatively, that since I must serve, and since, at 
this critical moment, my only service must take the form of a choice 
between loyalties … a decision … to do nothing, my loyalty to loyalty 
forbids; and therefore my principle clearly says to me after a fair 
considerations of the case: Decide, knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you 
must, but in any case decide, and have no fear. (2005, 930) 
 
The application of loyalty to loyalty may be beneficial during a pandemic and conducive 
to solidarity as it may minimize ethical dilemmas by addressing conflicts between 
loyalties and focus the community on action through a firm resolve to act. If a community 
finds it unacceptable to abandon the ill to care for themselves, then the community may 
resolve to undertake actions necessary to obtain the resources necessary to provide 
acceptable care. A good pandemic response plan will clearly identify a cause to which 
people can be loyal, identify challenging situations, clarify responsibilities, and provide 
guidance on potential courses of action. Furthermore, a good cause of loyalty will foster a 
sense of togetherness and assist in developing an attitude of solidarity in the community.  
 
                                                 
5
 Natural communities may include multiple social units such as the family unit. Also, natural communities 
are formed by religious affiliations. The values and priorities of religious groups is another important 
consideration pandemic planners must take in account as religious loyalties are strong, and thus a potential 
source of conflict.  
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Solidarity 
The notion of solidarity can function as a moral guide that leads to choices that 
protect and promote the common good. Solidarity requires that individuals put aside self-
interests and be willing to sacrifice some benefits for the good of the community. This 
suggests that members of a community be willing to complement one another by 
fulfilling roles and responsibilities not normally their own in service to the common 
good. During an emergency a community may become focused on a common purpose, 
such as survival and other related goals (Childress 2003). This allows the community to 
define a vision of the common good that is applicable during a pandemic, devise response 
strategies to deliver care, and identify social functions necessary to provide critical 
services. The common good viewpoint does not suggest that one person is morally better 
than another, but that certain social functions may have more social value during an 
emergency because the health of the community depends upon the functioning of 
particular roles.  
During a pandemic physicians, nurses, respiratory therapist, and other pandemic 
first responders are particularly valuable in that they serve specific social functions that 
provide for the common good and benefit the community. On one view those with the 
greatest responsibility for the common good during the emergency may receive priority 
access to treatment or prophylaxis so that they may continue to serve the common good 
and benefit the community (Haas 2002). As such solidarity may require community 
members to forego certain benefits, such as access to protective equipment and medical 
countermeasures to encourage health care workers to serve.  
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If maintaining medical services and providing care for the ill is the cause of the 
pandemic response plan, then the community must determine how to support the health 
care system and those providing care for the ill. Other important provisions for health 
care workers that are essential to maintaining the functioning of the health care delivery 
system include mental health counseling, flexible leave policies, as well as adequate rest 
and recuperation. An example of solidarity during a disaster comes from Hurricane 
Alison in 2001. The Texas Medical Center provided its staff with multiple services, 
including emergency funds, home supplies, crisis counseling, and social support 
programs (Qureshi et al. 2005).  
Solidarity also requires complementariness. Community members may express 
solidarity by volunteering during the pandemic to accept roles and duties not ordinarily 
their own. Primary care physicians may complement emergency room physicians, 
licensed registered nurses (LPN) may fulfill the role of a registered nurse (RN), security 
guards may complement police officers, and neighbor may complement neighbor. 
Furthermore, community member may express solidarity by volunteering with 
organizations like the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) or Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT), which may supplement health care facilities or law 
enforcement agencies by fulfilling necessary functions.  
In developing pandemic response plans, it is crucial for a community’s health care 
institutions, public leaders, faith-based organizations, and individual members to work 
collaboratively to determine the ways in which the community will support the delivery 
of care during the pandemic. It is also necessary to devise strategies to support health care 
workers and staff providing care. Pandemic response plans must show respect for persons 
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and ensure that societal conditions are consistent with the community’s conception of the 
common good. In this respect community leaders must cooperate with one another to 
minimize competing interests, and ensure the availability of basic goods such as food, 
shelter, health care, and security. Solidarity is a natural consequence of social life and life 
in a community imparts a reciprocal obligation on individuals to give back to the 
community that nurtures them. In this sense there is an obligation on the part of all 
community members to support conditions for the provision of care during a pandemic.  
 
Towards an Ethical Community Response  
A persistent question in ethics is: Why be moral? A correlative question in the 
context of pandemic planning is: Why participate in pandemic planning and response 
efforts? One response to the first question is that we are moral because human action 
draws upon the whole person as an agent, affects that person, and cannot leave that 
person indifferent to his action, for “it transforms that person for better or worse” 
(Schmitz 1993, 89). Likewise, in regards to pandemic planning and response, we are all 
members of some community and our action or inaction will have consequences that not 
only effect how we define our self, but also impact the well-being of other human beings 
and the community. Therefore, our membership in the community, our relationships with 
others, and our existence as acting moral agents requires our participation in pandemic 
preparedness and obligates us to provide care to those in need during a pandemic. 
Participation, loyalty, and solidarity are fundamental social values upon which 
communities are built and sustained. They can also serve as ethical norms that guide and 
influence the attitudes and behaviors of the community. As such, an ethical approach to 
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pandemic response planning cannot preclude the consideration of these important values. 
An ethical approach based on these values requires a broad community dialogue to define 
the common good, identify the ideal of care, articulate the cause of a pandemic response 
plan, and prioritize conditions necessary for human flourishing during the pandemic. The 
question becomes how to incorporate these values into pandemic planning in a manner 
that augments the decision-making process. In order to do this it is necessary to articulate 
these values in a form that functions as guidelines.  
The criterion for these values is to ask the following three-part question: Does this 
policy, action, or omission eliminate conditions necessary for participation, damage 
people’s loyalties, or decrease solidarity in the community? If pandemic response 
planning eliminates the opportunity for community members to participate in the 
planning and decision-making, then this plan should be revised to incorporate public 
input. If a policy damages individual and group loyalties, then it is an ethically 
unsatisfactory policy. If a pandemic response policy is designed in a manner that 
decreases solidarity in the community, then this policy warrants reconsideration. It is 
crucial that the public is engaged, well-informed, and prepared to act in ways that afford 
them the best opportunity to minimize harm during a pandemic. 
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